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Argumentation Schemes for Argument from Analogy (D. Walton) CRRAR
Systematic Approaches to Argument from Analogy, ed. H. J. Ribeiro, Heidelberg, Springer, 2014, 23-40.

There is such a huge literature on argument from analogy that during the early stages of my
career I avoided work on the subject because so many scholars in so many fields had already
written so much about it. When asked by a group of graduate students whether it would be a
good idea to start a research project on argument from analogy some time ago, I cautioned them
against it, or at least warned them about the dangers inherent in such a project, simply because of
this huge existing literature they would have to go through. The fields that comprise this
literature include not only argumentation studies, but also logic, cognitive science, ethics, law,
literature, philosophy of science, computer science and the social sciences generally (Guarini et
al., 2009). However, it is an important type of argument for us in the field of argumentation
studies to deal with, if only because it is such a common and pervasive form of argument almost
everywhere, but also because many logic textbooks have emphasized how it is an important
informal fallacy by citing examples of improper uses of argument from analogy (Kienpointner,
2012). So recently I too, yielding to necessity, have taken up writing on argument from analogy.
After surveying the literature on argument from analogy in some recent work, I came to the
conclusion that there are two different types of argument from analogy, each represented by its
own argumentation scheme (Walton, 2010; Walton, 2012). This was very puzzling at first,
because normally we would just like to have one scheme representing such a basic and
distinctive type of argument. But it appears that there is wide disagreement on precisely what
form the argument from analogy should be represented by, and below I will try to explain why in
the end the hypothesis that argument from analogy has two separate schemes is not such a bad
one and how this double scheme approach can be justified.
The first section of the paper uses some standard argument diagrams to explain how the first
scheme represents argument from analogy as proceeding from a source case to a target case. The
second section shows how this scheme applies to a famous case of argument from analogy in
philosophy. The third section introduces the second argumentation scheme, based on comparing
factors in two cases. The fourth section shows how factors are weighed in systems of case-based
reasoning. The fifth section presents a famous case of argument from analogy in legal rhetoric.
The sixth section models a notion of similarity using script-based technology from artificial
intelligence. The last section provides conclusions on how to evaluate argument from analogy.
1. The First Scheme
The following scheme (Walton, Reed and Macagno, 2008, 315) represents what is probably
the most widely accepted version of the scheme for argument from analogy advocated in the
logic textbooks and other relevant sources. C1 and C2 represent two cases.
Similarity Premise: Generally, case C1 is similar to case C2.
Base Premise: A is true (false) in case C1.
Conclusion: A is true (false) in case C2.
This scheme requires that in order for something to qualify as an argument from analogy it must
have one premise asserting that there is a similarity between two cases. A second requirement is
that a proposition A must hold in the first case, or must be a conclusion that can be drawn in the
first case. The conclusion drawn by the argument from analogy is that that A also holds in the
second case. This version of the scheme for argument from analogy is the one used in the
textbook (Walton, 2006, 96).
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The above version of the scheme conveys the basic idea behind it very well, but its ease of
applicability to real cases can be improved (as will be shown below) by modifying it slightly. In
the sequel, we will use this modified version.
Base Premise: A situation is described in C1.
Derived Premise: A is plausibly drawn as an acceptable conclusion in case C1.
Similarity Premise: Generally, case C1 is similar to case C2.
Conclusion: A is plausibly drawn as an acceptable conclusion in case C2.
It doesn’t matter too critically which scheme you use. Using either one is better than using none
at all. Whether a conclusion is plausibly drawn from a case depends on the audience to whom the
argument was supposedly directed. The modified version brings out better how the derived
premise is drawn as a conclusion by the audience from the source case. This modification makes
the base premise slightly more complex and wordy, but as the reader will shortly see, it fits cases
in a more natural way. Let us henceforth call this modified scheme the basic scheme for
argument from analogy.
It is part of every argumentation scheme that it must have a matching set of critical questions
that can be used to probe into weak parts of the argument of the type represented by the scheme
The following set of critical questions according to the account given (Walton, Reed and
Macagno, 2008, 315) matches the basic scheme for argument from analogy.
CQ1: Are there respects in which C1 and C2 are different that would tend to undermine the
force of the similarity cited?
CQ2: Is A the right conclusion to be drawn in C1?
CQ3: Is there some other case C3 that is also similar to C1, but in which some conclusion other
than A should be drawn?
The first critical question relates to differences between the two cases that could detract from the
strength of the argument from analogy, but respects in which two cases are similar could also be
used to support the argument from analogy. The second critical question rather nicely paves the
way to indicating why the reformulated version of the scheme is an improvement. A third critical
question is associated with a familiar type of counterargument called the argument from counteranalogy. The function of this critical question is to suggest doubt that could lead possibly to a
plausible counterargument that could be used to attack the original argument.
It will also help us to use the standard terminology in the literature on argument from analogy
to talk about the structure of argument from analogy.

A situation is described
in the source case.

Generally, the target case is
similar to the source case.

A conclusion is drawn by the
audience in the source case.

A comparable conclusion is
drawn in the target case.

SOURCE CASE

TARGET CASE

Figure 1: The Transition from the Source Case to the Target Case
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In the argumentation scheme above, the original case C1 used to set up the argument from
analogy is called the source case. The case C2 to which the situation in the first case is compared
is called the target case. How argument works as a transfer of data from one case through an
argument to another case is graphically shown in figure 1.
In figure 2 we see the characteristic movement from one case to another that is the basic
mechanism of argument from analogy. But the structure of the argument as a sequence of
reasoning where the basic scheme links the premises to the conclusion has not been revealed yet.
Figure 2 shows how argument from analogy, and also argument from counteranalogy poised
to attack an argument from analogy that was originally set forth, can be visually represented
using an argument diagram. In this diagram the propositions composing the premises and
conclusion are shown in text boxes, and the inferential link leading from a premise or a set of
premises to a conclusion is drawn by an arrow leading to the conclusion on a set of lines leading
to the premises. In the intersection of these lines there is a node representing the argument itself,
which is shown on the diagram containing annotation representing the name of the
argumentation scheme.
A situation is described
in the source case.

A conclusion C is drawn
in the source case.

+AN

A conclusion comparable to C
should be drawn in the target case.

The target case is similar
to the source case.
-AN

There is a
third case.

The third case is similar
to the target case.

A conclusion other than C
is drawn in the third case.

Figure 2: Argument from Analogy with Argument from Counteranalogy
The diagram has been drawn in the style of an argument map constructed with the Carneades
Argumentation System, where every argument is represented as a pro or con argument. A pro
argument has a plus sign in its argument node while a con argument has a minus sign in its
argument node. Accordingly, in figure 2, the argument from analogy at the top is represented as
a pro argument supporting conclusion on the right. The argument at the bottom is represented as
a con argument that attacks the conclusion of the prior argument.
It is often said in argumentation studies that there are three basic ways an argument can be
attacked. You can attack one or more of the premises, you can attack the conclusion, or you can
attack the inferential link between the premises and conclusion. In this instance the argument
from counteranalogy is used to argue that the conclusion of the prior argument from analogy is
not acceptable. The type of attack represented in figure 2 is of the second type where the attack is
against the conclusion of the prior argument.
2. The Violinist Example
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Possibly the most famous use of argument from analogy argument from analogy in twentiethcentury philosophy was the violinist example of Thomson (1971, 48-49), quoted below.
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious
violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney
ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records
and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore
kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged into yours, so
that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The
director of the hospital now tells you, “Look, we're sorry the Society of Music Lovers did
this to you - we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and
the violinist now is plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never
mind, it’s only for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and can
safely be unplugged from you.”
This argument was deployed by Thomson to support the thesis that a woman should have the
right to terminate her pregnancy, by arguing that the person in the example should have the right
to unhook the violinist. The basis of the argument is that the situation of the violinist is similar to
the situation of a pregnant woman. The conclusion that will plausibly be drawn by anyone
presented with the situation of the violinist, as Thomson rightly supposed, is that the person in
the example should have the right to unplug himself from the violinist, even though the violinist
will die as a result. But since this source case is similar to the target case of a woman who is
pregnant, the conclusion suggested in the target case is that a pregnant woman may terminate her
pregnancy, even though the fetus will die as a result.
How the refined version of the basic scheme for argument from analogy applies to the
violinist argument can be shown visually in figure 3.
A situation is described in the
violinist case (the source case).
The conclusion that the violinist
should have the right to unplug
himself is drawn in the source case.

+AN

The pregnant woman should have
the right to terminate her pregnancy.

The pregnant woman case is
similar to the violinist case.

Figure 3: Argument from Analogy in the Violinist Case
There are many ways to support or attack this argument. Some might want to extend it further
by claiming that it justifies abortion. However, this particular issue has been so widely and hotly
disputed that it also turns on how the term ‘abortion’ is defined. The pro-choice side defines it as
removal of the fetus whereas the pro-life side defines it as the killing of a person. So there are all
kinds of controversial counterargument moves surrounding this case, but this paper is not the
place to comment on these. Nevertheless, the case can be used to illustrate how some types of
arguments from analogy work, precisely because it is a powerful and clever argument, and
probably the best-known use of argument from analogy in recent philosophy.
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There are many ways to support or attack Thomson’s argument in the huge literature it
provoked, but that is not our subject here. All we need to observe is that CQ2 is possibly the
critical question that an audience who is not so enthusiastically pro-choice or pro-life would be
most naturally inclined to raise. In the source case the violinist and the person to whom he was
attached are presumed to be unrelated, while in the abortion case the woman and the fetus are
arguably related. There is also another aspect of the argument to be careful about. Because it is
true in the source case that the person in the example was kidnapped and so did nothing himself
to cause the violinist to be attached to him, the argument from analogy is only applicable to cases
where the woman had no choice about becoming pregnant, for example, cases of rape. This
narrowing of the range of the argument detracts considerably for the weight of its support for the
conclusion that abortion should be generally acceptable if a woman chooses it.
From a point of view of argumentation theory, the most interesting aspect of the example is
how the notion of similarity in the similarity premise can be defined or analyzed. I have
previously put forward a theory that provides an answer to this question, but before introducing
it, let’s go on to consider another very different but equally interesting kind of example.
3. The Second Scheme
The second scheme proposed to model analogical argument is the dominant one in the logic
textbooks. It is advocated in the two most widely used logic textbooks. It treats the argument
from analogy as an inductive form of argument that requires no reference to similarity. In this
respect, it can be sharply contrasted with the first scheme.
Copi and Cohen (1990, 358) offer the example of a conjecture on whether the planets Saturn,
Jupiter, Mars, Venus and Mercury, might have living creatures on them. This example is an old
one that has been superseded by the advance of science, but it is at least clear enough to be used
to try to grasp how Copi and Cohen’s form of analogical argument is supposed to fit some more
or less realistic case. The premises are the observations of similarities between these planets and
earth. All these planets revolve around the sun, collect light from the sun, revolve around their
axis, have a succession of day and night, and so forth. They all share all these characteristics with
planet Earth. There are also certain respects in which they differ from Earth. Some of them
revolve around their axis in a manner like Earth, while others do not. Some have moons, while
others do not. According to the example, the conclusion drawn from these similarities, despite
the differences, is that it is reasonable to think that these planets may, like Earth, exhibit the
habitation of various orders of living creatures.
To represent the structure of argument from analogy in this example Copi and Cohen (1990,
360) offer the following form they call analogical argument.
Entities a, b, c, d all have the attributes P and Q.
a, b, c all have the attribute R.
Therefore d probably has the attribute R.
Copi and Cohen (1990, 357) state that arguments of this form are inductive, not deductive. They
(363-365) offer six criteria for appraising analogical arguments. Four are worth mentioning here:
the number of entities compared, the number of respects in which the things compared are said to
be analogous, the number of disanalogies or points of differences between the entities compared
and the entity in the conclusion, and whether the analogies are relevant.
Let’s try to see how their form of argument fits their planets example. Start with the
conclusion. Earth fits in for the variable d, and R means having habitation of living creatures,
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since the conclusion is the statement that Earth, exhibits the habitation of various orders of living
creatures. But that is not the conclusion. As noted above, the conclusion is the statement that it is
reasonable to think that these other planets may, like Earth, exhibit the habitation of various
orders of living creatures. How the form fits the example is unclear.
Hurley (2003, 469) offers the following structure to represent the form of argument from
analogy.
Entity A has attributes a, b, c and z.
Entity B has attributes a, b, c.
Therefore, entity B probably has z also.
This format of this structure for argument from analogy is different from the one offered by Copi
and Cohen, but the motivating idea behind it seems to be pretty much the same. Hurley also
classifies argument from analogy as an inductive form of argument. Also in a manner quite
similar to Copi and Cohen’s approach, Hurley, 469-470 offers six criteria for appraising
analogical arguments: (1) relevance of the similarities, (2) number of similarities, (3) nature and
degree of disanalogy, (4) number of primary analogues, (5) diversity among the primary
analogues, and (6) specificity of the conclusion.
Hurley (2003, 469-470) illustrates these criteria using with a leading example. In this example
a woman called Lucy is deciding on which new car to buy. She decides in favor of the Chevrolet
because she wants good gas mileage and she has observed that her friend Tom has a new
Chevrolet and it gets good gas mileage. But some other similarities might be irrelevant. Both
cars have a padded steering wheel, vinyl upholstery, tinted windows and white paint. Additional
similarities which would support the argument from analogy might include such things as the
weight of the car, whether it has an aerodynamic body, and the kinds of tires that are on it.
Differences between the two cars might be that Tom’s car has overdrive but Lucy’s does not, or
that Lucy's car is equipped with a turbocharger and Tom’s is not. The number of analogues
might include additional cases known to Lucy. Three of her friends drive cars similar to Tom’s
and all three get good gas mileage. The factor of diversity among the cases cited is illustrated by
the example of Lucy’s four friends who all do their driving on level streets in a cautious manner
that minimizes fuel consumption. The sixth criterion of specificity of the conclusion is less easy
to explain, but what Hurley is telling us is that we have to pay attention to the way the conclusion
is stated because a more specific conclusion will be harder to prove and easier to falsify than one
that is less specific.
How Hurley’s proposed form of the argument from analogy fits his example is clearer. The
conclusion is the presumably the statement that if Lucy buys a Chevrolet, this car will get good
gas mileage According to Hurley (470), Lucy’s conclusion is that her car will get good gas
mileage, but technically it is not her car until she buys it. The argument is also an instance of
goal-directed decision-making on what to do under conditions of uncertainty. The argument
supporting this conclusion is that Tom’s Chevrolet (assumed to share many attributes with the
one Lucy will buy), has the attribute of good gas mileage. The variable B represents the car Lucy
is considering buying, and the variable z represents the attribute of getting good gas mileage. The
example can then be expanded to take other Chevrolet owners in to account. If they get good
mileage this evidence supports the argument from analogy. If there are some Chevrolets that do
not get good gas mileage, this evidence undermines (weakens) the argument from analogy.
For purposes of ease of applicability to cases, I would say that Hurley’s version is an
improvement on Copi and Cohen’s. But the main thing we need take from these observations is
that the two leading logic textbooks both present a fundamentally similar account of the form of

7
the argument from analogy. Both have this same sort of underlying structure as arguments,
which can be formulated succinctly as a rule of inference. To grasp the rule of inference, begin
with the instance of it in Hurley’s example. If Lucy’s car shares a set of properties with other
Chevrolets, and the other Chevrolets also exhibit some new property not included in the original
set, then Lucy’s car is likely to have this new property as well. The general rule of inference can
now be formulated as follows: if one designated entity shares a set of properties with other
entities, and the other entities also exhibit some new property not included in the original set, the
designated entity is likely, on a balance of considerations, to have this new property as well.
The most important thing to notice about this way of representing the logical form of
argument from analogy is that it makes no reference to the notion of similarity. The textbook
accounts make argument from analogy seem highly objective. It looks like it represents a type of
argument that can be evaluated in a scientific and objective manner using inductive reasoning to
count up the properties shared by a set of entities to provide positive evidence supporting the
argument from analogy and subtract the negative evidence of entities that fail to share common
properties. There is no need for students to ask embarrassing questions about similarity.
4. Weighing Factors Using the Second Scheme
Now we turn to the second scheme for argument from analogy. The problem with this
scheme, as set forth in the standard textbook treatments, is that it is unclear in many respects how
it fits real examples, and hence trying to apply schemes offered in the textbooks was somewhat
confusing. Luckily this scheme has been formulated in a simpler way that is more useful. Guarini
(2004, 161) offered a scheme for argument from analogy that he calls the core scheme, where a
and b are individual objects.
Premise 1: a has features f1, f2, . . . , fn.
Premise 2: b has features f1, f2, . . . , fn.
Conclusion: a and b should be treated or classified in the same way with respect to f1, f2, . . . , fn.
It would seem plausible that the features f1, f2, . . . , fn can be treated as representing the factors
that were discussed above in relating case-based reasoning to the second scheme. The Chevrolet
case we looked at from Hurley showed how the second scheme is applied to cases by identifying
pro and contra factors, factors in which the two cases at issue are similar or different. In the
discussion above we already identified the rule underlying this scheme. The rule basically states
that the argument from analogy is supported by factors both cases share, but at the same time the
argument from analogy is undermined by factors that both cases fail to share. This rule is fine as
far as it goes, but the problem is that it is not just counting up of the factors that make the
argument from analogy weaker or stronger. In addition some level of importance or weight has
to be attached to each factor. In case-based reasoning, the more a factor is “on point” (relevant),
the greater weight it carries. Any factor that is irrelevant carries no weight.
The methods of evaluating an argument from analogy in standard case-based reasoning
(CBR) uses respects in which two cases are similar or different called dimensions and factors.
The HYPO system (Ashley, 2006) uses dimensions. A dimension is a relevant aspect of the case
that can take a range of values that move along the scale with values that support one side on a
disputed issue at one end and the opposed party at the other end. CATO is a simpler CBR system
(Aleven, 1997) that uses factors.
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Factors in Hurley’s case of Lucy buying the car would include the following: the model of
car, the size of the motor, having overdrive, having a turbocharger, the weight of the car, what
kinds of tires are on the car, having a padded steering wheel, having tinted windows, and paint
color. Some factors are relevant while others are not. Factors can also be seen as arguments
favoring one side or the other in relation to the issue being disputed. Having more relevant
factors in common between the source case and the target case supports the argument from
analogy. Having more relevant factors not in common between the source case and the target
case detracts from the argument from analogy.
Factors can also be seen as arguments favoring one side or the other in relation to the issue
being disputed. On this approach, argument from analogy is seen as a defeasible form of
argument in which pro factors represents similarities that support the argument while con factors
represent dissimilarities undermine or detract from the argument. Typically in argument from
analogy some factors support the argument, while other factors undermine it. Then to weigh the
strength of the argument from analogy, we have to weigh the pro factors against the con factors.
To do this numerically we have to attach a positive or negative number to each factor providing a
measure of how relevant that factor is one way or the other. If we could use numbers of this sort
to calculate the strength of an argument from analogy, the argument could rightly be classified as
inductive, as they advocate. But if this numerical approach does not seem promising, there is also
another approach. On this approach, argument from analogy can be seen as dialectical.
Typically, in this kind of format, we have an argument from analogy that supports a claim A
made by one side, and then on the other side an opposed argument from analogy that supports
claim not-A. To comparatively weigh up the strength of the one argument as compared to the
strength of the opposed argument, we have to bring in factors that identify the respects in which
one case is similar to the other, and have some device for estimating how similar one is to the
other by attaching weights to similarity. But there is always the problem of how misleading it
might be to attach numbers to the weight of importance each factor should have in a given case.
There may be a way we can use argumentation methods to solve this problem however. We can
get a clue how it should work by looking at CBR.
HYPO evaluates arguments from analogy in a three-step method called three-ply
argumentation (Ashley, 1988, 206), which can also be modeled as a series of moves in a formal
dialogue. At the first move, the proponent puts forward an argument from analogy by finding a
comparable past case in which the outcome closely matches that of the proponent’s thesis
because the two cases share one or more factors. At the second move, the respondent can reply to
the original argument from analogy in one of the following ways, corresponding to critical
questions matching the scheme for argument from analogy. She can reply by finding a counteranalogy, a past case that matches the current case but which has the opposite outcome. Another
reply is to “distinguish” the case (as this move often called) by pointing to factors present in the
new case that are absent in the previous one. At the third move, the proponent can reply in one of
several ways. These might include distinguishing counterexamples, pointing out additional
factors, or citing other cases showing that the respondent’s attack does not really rebut his
argument from analogy. The three-ply argumentation could be used to effectively set up the pre
and post conditions for a formal dialogue model of a critical discussion in which one type of
move is the bringing forth of an argument from analogy by citing factors common to the source
case and the target case, and another type of move allows an appropriate critical response of the
kinds outlined above.
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5. The Silkwood Case
The next example is a use of argument from analogy by attorney Gerry Spence in the case of
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corporation. Karen Silkwood was a technician who had the job of
grinding and polishing plutonium pins used to make fuel rods for nuclear reactors. She was
active in union activities and had investigated health and safety issues at the plant. She had
testified before an atomic energy commission that Kerr-McGee had violated safety regulations.
Tests in 1974 showed that she that she had been exposed to dangerously high levels of plutonium
radiation. High levels of radioactive contamination were found in her apartment. After she died
from radiation poisoning, her father brought an action against Kerr-McGee in which the
Corporation was held to be at fault for her death on the basis of strict liability. According to strict
liability law, a person can be held accountable for the harmful consequences of some dangerous
activity he was engaged in, without having to prove that he was aware of or intended the
outcome, or even that he was negligent. The standard example is that if a zookeeper has a
dangerous lion in a cage, if the lion escapes and causes harm to some person, the zookeeper is
strictly liable for the harm that was caused.
Spence’s closing argument in this case used the analogy of the escaping lion with great
rhetorical effect on the jury. In his speech to the jury he emphasized and repeated this statement
“If the lion got away, Kerr-McGee has to pay” (Lief et al., 1998, 129).
Some guy brought an old lion on his ground, and he put it in a cage - and lions are
dangerous -and through no negligence of his own through no fault of his own, the lion
got away. Nobody knew how - like in this case, ‘‘nobody knew how’’. And, the lion went
out and he ate up some people - and they sued the man. And they said, you know: ‘‘Pay.
It was your lion, and he got away’’. And the man says: ‘‘But I did everything in my
power - I had a good cage - had a lock on the door - I did everything that I could - I had
security - I had trained people watching the lion - and it isn’t my fault that he got away’’.
Why should we punish him? They said: ‘‘We have to punish him - we have to punish you
- you have to pay’’. You have to pay because it was your lion - unless the person who
was hurt let the lion out himself.
In this instance Spence used the lion analogy during his closing argument, a part of the trial for
summing up one’s argument in a case. In his opening statement, Spence had also used the
example of the escaping lion to illustrate to the jury how strict liability works, showing them
how cases of this kind had originated in English common law. In his closing argument, he was
using the same argument about the lion over again with great rhetorical effect. Spence’s
argument in this famous case has been said to be “as fine a closing argument as has ever been
delivered in an American courtroom” (Lief et al., 1998, 123-124).
Spence was using an analogy to compare what happened in the Silkwood case to what
happened in the lion example that is described in simple and graphic terms. The lion example is
the source case in the argument from analogy. Spence used the example to illustrate that strict
liability law would hold the lion owner responsible for the harm that took place when the lion
attacked some innocent person and injured her, even though the lion keeper had taken great care
to have proper security, including trained people watching the animal. The target case is similar
to the source case. The plutonium escaped from Silkwood’s workplace, so to speak, and caused
harm to her, and this sequence of events is similar to the ones in the lion case. Therefore all
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Spence had to prove is that Karen Silkwood was harmed by the plutonium. In his summary
argument, Spence reminds the jury that this claim has been proved during the trial by the
evidence brought forward, and that there is no need to repeat the facts that were used to prove it.
All that needs to be proved, Spence maintains, in parallel with the lion case, is that the plutonium
got away and that Karen Silkwood was damaged. This argument was a rhetorically powerful one.
It persuaded the jury to find the Kerr-McGee Corporation liable for over ten million dollars.
In this case, the argument from analogy does all the work. The problem is to grasp how it
does that. As a first attempt, we can visualize the argument as shown in figure 4.
In the lion case, the lion owner had taken
great care to have proper security.

The law holds the lion
owner liable for the harm.

Nevertheless, the lion escaped
and someone was harmed.

In the lion case, the law held the owner
of the escapee liable for the harm.

The lion case is similar
to the Silkwood case.

+AN

In the Silkwood case, Kerr-McGee had
taken care to have proper security.
The law holds Kerr-McGee
liable for the harm.
Nevertheless, the plutonium escaped
from the plant and Silkwood was harmed.

Figure 4: How the Source Case Supports the Argument of the Target Case
To get a clue how Spence’s argument in the Silkwood case could be represented using the
scheme for argument from analogy, we need to recall how in section 1 the argument from
analogy was described as a two-step argument from the base premise to a derived premise, and
from there to a conclusion. Using this scheme, argument from analogy represents a two-step type
of argument. This two-step configuration is shown in figure 4. At the top the lion argument is
shown, representing the source case. At the bottom the Silkwood case is shown, representing the
target case. In the middle, an argument from analogy goes from a premise derived from the
conclusion of the source case, along with the similarity premise, to the ultimate conclusion that
the law holds Kerr-McGee liable. In the source case, as well as the target case, the argument is
also at taken to support the similarity premise of the argument from analogy.
This structure is a rather complicated one, however, and not very helpful in giving us a clear
and easily understandable analysis of how the argument from analogy works in transferring
evidence from the source case to the target case. Hence we need to look for another method of
modeling structure of the argument from analogy in the Silkwood case. It is a simple and
powerful argument, and that is part of what accounts for its rhetorical success when used by
Spence. But we still haven’t been able to model the structure of that simple and powerful
argument in a satisfactory way. So now we turn to an altogether different approach.
6. Scripts and Similarity
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The first scheme is most markedly different from the second one in that it had a premise
stating that one case is similar to another. The main problem with applying the first scheme to
any realistic examples of arguments from analogy is to define the notion of similarity. There can
be different kinds of similarity, but there is a way of defining one kind that can be shown to be
important in building a method for evaluating arguments from analogy.
The notion of a script has been around for a while in artificial intelligence (Schank and
Abelson, 1977). According to the theory of scripts put forward here, a script is defined as a
sequence of states where one state follows naturally from another so that a sequence of states can
be chained together. The scripts we are concerned with in this paper are comparable to sequences
of actions of the kind studied in the branch of philosophy called action theory. An example is the
following sequence: Bob swings his golf club, he hits a golf ball, the golf ball flies through the
air, the golf ball lands on the grass, the golf ball rolls towards the cup, the golf ball stops at a
point six inches short of the cup. We can see from the example that each state in the sequence is
represented as a proposition in which an agent carries out an action. All of us understand that in
order for the sequence to be comprehensible the propositions fall naturally into a certain ordering
so that it can be established by a participant in an argument using common knowledge what that
ordering is. A script can be defined as a set of states and a set of so-called links. A script in this
sense is (1) a finite sequence of states, S1, S2, . . .,Sn, and a set of links, L1, L2, . . , Ln, joining each
state to the one before and one after it, excluding only the first state L1 and the last state, Ln , (2)
such that it is clear to participants in an argument which is the first member of the sequence,
which is the last member of the sequence, and for any member of the sequence between the first
and the last member, which is the one before and the one after it. The ordering is not necessarily
a temporal one, but it often is, and it is not necessarily a causal one but it often is. Links can be
of different kinds, so that the sequence is not defined by any one kind of link. Rather the
sequence is defined by the way it hangs together in common knowledge we all have about the
way things can be normally expected to go in a kind of situation familiar to us from past
experiences.
A sequence of this sort is often called a story or narrative. Pennington and Hastie (1992)
studied many examples to show how juries in trials use story structures to organize and interpret
evidence in a legal case at trial, enabling them to make sense of the evidence as a whole by
organizing it into a mental representation. Stories are different from argumentation schemes, but
they are often based on argumentation schemes, especially the scheme for practical reasoning. In
practical reasoning an agent has a goal, and sees that carrying out an action would be a means to
realize the goal. For this reason the agent concludes that it ought practically speaking to carry out
the action. This kind of reasoning is very common in legal cases, for example in criminal cases
where an action is presumed to have a goal.
Bex (2011) built a hybrid theory of reasoning with stories to reconstruct complex networks of
evidence in criminal cases. His theory is called a hybrid system because it combines story-based
explanations with arguments. One feature of it is that evidence in the form of arguments can
support parts of an explanation that can be modeled with a script. Another aspect of Bex’s theory
that will be applied here is that something called a story scheme can be derived from the events
in a script through a process of applying abstractions. By this means a script that links together a
sequence of events or actions described in the story can also be represented at a more abstract
level by means of a story scheme. Bex and Prakken (2010) have shown how stories can be
investigated and evaluated in a formal dialogue game.
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The device of the story scheme can be applied to Spence’s argument from analogy in the
Silkwood case to map the sequence in the source case to the sequence in the target case. If we
put the lion in for x, the person who was injured in for y, and the lion owner in for z, we get the
story of the lion that escaped and attacked the person who was harmed. But we can also fill in the
variables as shown in figure 5, and then we get the Silkwood story. It is this abstract story
scheme that shows how the target case is similar to the source case in the most significant
respect. The script in the two cases can be seen to be similar by the audience (in this instance, the
jury), and because of their common knowledge of the way things generally work, they are
impressed by the analogy and draw the conclusion that Spence wants them to.

x is very
dangerous
to person y.

x is securely
contained so
it can cause
no harm to y.

x belongs to
z who keeps
x securely
contained.

x is no
longer
securely
contained.

Nobody
knows how
x got out.

x
harms
y.

z is liable to y for the
harm caused to y.

Figure 5: Story Scheme for Spence’s Argument from Analogy in the Silkwood Case
A notion of similarity that can be used to model many cases of argument from analogy can be
modeled using this hybrid theory of scripts (Walton, 2012). Gerry Spence’s argument from
analogy in his closing argument in the Silkwood case can be used as an illustration.

Witness Smith said
that plutonium is very
dangerous to humans.

Witness Smith
is an expert.

Kerr-McGee admitted in court that
the plutonium belonged to them.

Witnesses testified
that Kerr-McGee
kept the plutonium
securely contained,

+WT

+CT
+EX

Plutonium
is very
dangerous
to
employees.

The plutonium
was securely
contained so
it can cause
no harm to
employees.

The
plutonium
belonged to
Kerr-McGee
who kept it
securely
contained.

The
Plutonium
was no
longer
securely
contained.

Kerr-McGee is liable to Silkwood
for the harm caused to her.

Nobody
knows
how the
plutonium
got out.

Silkwood
was
harmed
by the
plutonium.
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Figure 6: The Silkwood Case Modeled as a Story with Evidential Backing
If we look along the middle row of figure 6, we see this story in the Silkwood case
instantiated as an instance of the story scheme shown in figure 5. While the story scheme shown
in figure 5 is an abstract sequence, the Silkwood story shown along the middle row of figure 6
represents the actual sequence of events representing the story in the case. To show how the
similarity between the two cases is modeled, we could also make a figure of the similar story in
the lion case: the lion is very dangerous, the lion was securely contained so it could cause no
harm, the lion belong to the lion owner who kept it securely contained, the lion was no longer
securely contained, nobody knows how the lion got out, a person was harmed by the lion after it
escaped. What explains the similarity is that both the sequence of events in the lion case and in
the Silkwood case is the abstract story scheme shown in figure 5.
It could be stressed that what is especially interesting here is that the matching of the two
stories shows that the similarity between the two cases holds not just because each state in the
one case matches a comparable state in the other case. Over and above this matching of single
states, the matching of two stories represents the kind of similarity that supports an argument
from analogy because it is the same story scheme applicable to both cases that makes the one
case similar to the other in the most important respect.
There are some other aspects shown in figure 6 that are also important to comment on. One is
the conclusion drawn from the sequence of states shown in the middle row. This conclusion is
the proposition that Kerr-McGee is liable to Silkwood for the harm caused to her. According to
the theory advocated here, this conclusion is the one drawn from the sequence of states shown
above it. Another important aspect of figure 6 is that four statements appear in text boxes along
the top row of the diagram, displaying three arguments that are used as evidence to support some
of the elements in the sequence of propositions in the middle row. In each case the name of the
argumentation scheme is shown in the node of the argument. The argument on the left is a pro
argument from expert opinion. The argument in the middle is a pro argument from commitment.
The argument on the right is a pro argument from witness testimony.
Thus we can see that figure 6 displays the five characteristic elements of the theory of
similarity put forward. The first one is that there is a sequence of propositions (a set of states and
links joining them), that makes up the story in the target case, and is an instance of a story
scheme. The second one is that there is a conclusion drawn from the story. The third one is that
evidence in the form of arguments can be used to support the elements of the story, make it more
plausible. The fourth one is that the story in the target case is an instance of an abstract story
scheme. The fifth one is that the story in the source case fits the same story scheme.
7. Conclusions
The solution to the problem is to combine the two argumentation schemes for argument from
analogy. The first scheme can be applied to a text to identify an argument from analogy and
explain its initial impact. The second scheme allows for deeper analysis and evaluation of the
argument by weighing the pro against the con factors.
The first scheme is simple enough. It simply says that if two cases are similar, and a
particular conclusion can be drawn in the first case, then the same conclusion (or a comparable
one) can be drawn in the second case. That conditional represents the rule of inference (the socalled warrant) behind the first scheme. The problem with the first scheme was to define the
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notion of similarity. Above a script-based model of how to represent similarity was presented
and illustrated using the argument from analogy put forward by Gerry Spence in Silkwood case.
Now we can see how the same script-based theory of similarity can also be applied to the
violinist case. Figure 7 shows how the abstract story script that displays the similarity between
the case of the violinist and the case of the justification of abortion leads to the abstract
conclusion that is applicable to both cases.

Person x
has another
person y
attached to
his/her
body.

Person x
had no
choice
about the
arrangement.

Having y
attached
is an
encumbrance for
x.

Having this
encumbrance will
hinder x’s
daily
activities.

y will die
if
removed
from x.

y can only
survive if
attached
to x for 9
months.

SCRIPT

Any case fitting this script allows the
following form of conclusion to be inferred.

x should be permitted to have
a choice about removing y.

Figure 7: The Story Scheme Supporting the Argument from Analogy of the Violinist Case
What the diagram in figure 7 shows in an abstract way is the similarity underlying the two cases
that is the basis of the argument from analogy from the source case to the target case. The story
scheme representing the similarity in an abstract manner supports the similarity premise of the
basic argumentation scheme for argument from analogy.
As shown in section 4, applying the second scheme requires a three-ply case-based dialogue
system. How would such a formal dialogue model solve the problem of assigning weights to the
factors in an argument from analogy without running afoul of the problem of assigning
numerical weights to each factor that might be arbitrary? The solution advocated here is to do
this in the normal way we are familiar with in formal dialogue models of argumentation. The
claim that a factor is present in a given case, or is not present in a given case, or the claim that
the factor is important in deciding the outcome of the case, or is not, can be evaluated by
examining the details of the case, or the pair of cases at issue. Such a procedure can be used to
see how the arguments in the case support or undermine these claims. The method that CBR uses
to weigh factors is to place values on them representing the extent to which factor is “on point”.
To be on point essentially means that the factor is relevant in relation to the issue being disputed.
What this observation reveals is that ultimately CBR depends on an analysis of the notion of
relevance. But the best way to model relevance is to use a formal model of the critical discussion
requiring that a conflict of opinions is identified at the opening stage. It is this initial conflict of
opinions that determines whether a given argument is relevant or not, and it can also be used to
determine whether a factor in an argument from analogy is on point or not.
This project can be carried out formally in a number of ways. One way would be to use a
formal computational system such as the Carneades Argumentation System (CAS), a threevalued system in which premises and conclusions are assigned one of the following three values:
(in) accepted, (out) rejected, or (neither in nor out) stated but not accepted (Gordon, 2010). CAS
has an opening stage, an argumentation stage and a closing stage (Gordon, Prakken and Walton,
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2007). Relevance of the kind discussed above can be modeled in CAS or comparable
knowledge-based argumentation systems. Modeling the evaluation of arguments from analogy in
this way has not yet been carried out in any formal dialectical model, but the research project of
constructing such a model is within the reach of the current technology of formal dialogue
systems. Such a project, at any rate, presents us with an alternative to the Bayesian proposal of
treating argument from analogy as an inductive form of argument that can be evaluated using
numerical probability values.
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Abstract: Argumentation Schemes for Argument from Analogy
In this paper I show how there are two different argumentation schemes for argument from
analogy, and show by means of examples how each scheme applies to different cases in its own
distinctive way. One scheme is based on similarity, while the other scheme is based on factors
shared or not shared by two cases that are being compared. The problem confronted in the paper
is to study how the two schemes fit together. Are there really two different schemes for argument
from analogy, or is the one scheme an extension of the other that applies at a different dialectical
stage of the argumentation in a case? Since argument from analogy is fundamental in case-based
reasoning and legal reasoning, there is some discussion of how the schemes fit into both topics.

